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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates how well-being varies with individual wage rates when 
individuals care about relative consumption and so there are Veblen effects – Keeping up 
with the Joneses – leading individuals to over-work.  In the case where individuals 
compare themselves with their peers – those with the same wage-rate - it is shown that 
Keeping up with the Joneses leads some individuals to work who otherwise would have 
chosen not to.  Moreover for these individuals well-being is a decreasing function of the 
wage rate  - contrary to standard theory.  So those who are worst-off in society are no 
longer those on the lowest wage.   
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Keeping Up with the Joneses: Who Loses? 
 
Introduction 
 
Dating back to Veblen (1924), there is an extensive literature on conspicuous 
consumption whereby individuals lose esteem if their consumption of some good(s) 
which signal their status is below the average of the reference/peer group and gain esteem 
if their consumption exceeds the average. It is recognised that this can lead to  a ‘rat race” 
in which individuals over-consume, with a consequent need to fund this extra 
consumption by either working harder or saving less ( Frank (1985), Schor (1998)). This 
over-consumption is referred to as the Veblen Effect
2
 or the Keeping up with the Joneses 
Effect
3
.    
 
This paper develops some further implications for behaviour and well-being when people 
are concerned about their consumption relative to their peers – taken to be those with a 
similar wage rate
4
.  It is shown that the Keeping up with the Joneses Effect can lead 
people to work who would otherwise have chosen not to, and that, for such individuals 
well-being will be a strictly decreasing function of their wage rate.  Thus those who are 
least well off in society are not those with the lowest wage.   
 
1. The Model 
 
Individuals are endowed solely with 1 unit of time that can be spent on work or leisure.  
There is a tax/benefit system whereby everyone receives a tax-free universal benefit, 
0σ >  and all earned income is taxed at the rate , 0 1τ τ< < .   Individuals differ in their 
productivity which is reflected in their net wage rate 0ω ≥ .  An individual with net wage 
ω  who spends a fraction  , 0 1≤ ≤l l  of  time on leisure will end up with consumption
(1 )c ω σ= − +l .     
 
Individual well-being is a combination of well-offness, y,  and happiness, h, as given by 
the function: 
    1 , 0 1w h yθ θ θ−= ≤ ≤ .   (1) 
Here: 
(i) Well-offness,  y,  is captured by a utility function  
( ),y u c= l      (2) 
satisfying the standard assumptions – e.g. concavity.  
(ii)  Happiness measures individuals’ perceptions of how well their life is going in 
comparison to their peers – those with the same net wage-rate, ω.   It is assumed 
                                                
2
 The Veblen effect has also been invoked to help explain the Easterlin Paradox  - Easterlin (2001).  
3
 This has led to arguments for either taxing such conspicuous consumption or increasing the rate of income tax – see 
Boskin and Sheshinski (1978) - to correct the consumption externality. 
4
 Beath and Fitzroy (2009) also consider a model in which individuals compare their consumption to that of others with 
the same productivity/wage-rate.  They also show that Keeping up with the Joneses can lead individuals to over-work.  
However their model and analysis differs in other respects from that considered here, and they do not obtain the crucial 
result set out in Proposition 1 below.  
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that this depends on an individual’s consumption relative to the average 
consumption 0c >  of their peers, and that happiness is given by: 
 
    
1
c
cc
h
c c c
c
= =
++
    (3) 
The two reasons for adopting this functional form for happiness are:  
a) Happiness is thereby bounded between 0 and 1, reflecting the way happiness 
is traditionally measured on some finite scale. 
b) Labour supply decisions depend on the average consumption of others.  If, 
instead, happiness depends solely on c
c
 then, given (1) , the average 
consumption of others would exert a negative externality on individual well-
being but would not affect behaviour – thereby missing a crucial feature of the 
Keeping up with the Joneses effect
5
.   
 
The  parameter θ determines how much individual well-being depends on relative 
consumption
6
.  So if  0θ =  we have the conventional economists’ story about well-
being, and there will be no Keeping up with the Joneses Effect.  If 0 1θ< ≤  then the 
Keeping up with the Joneses Effect is present, and is increasing in θ.  Combining (1) – (3) 
well-being can be written as: 
 
   ( ) ( )1, , ; ,
c
w c c u c
c c
θ
θ
θ
− 
=  
+ 
l l ,    (4) 
 
2. Individual Labour Supply and Well-Being 
 
Consider an individual with  net wage rate ω.  The individual takes as given 
0c >  -   the average consumption of those with the same net wage rate - and chooses 
labour supply (effort)  1e = − l  to maximise well-being,   
  ( ) ( )
1
,1 , , ,1
e
w e e c u e e
e c
θ
θσ ω
σ ω θ σ ω
σ ω
−+ 
 + − ≡ + −   
+ + 
  (5) 
Let  
  ( ) ( )
0 1
, , ; argmax ,1 , ;
e
e f c w e e cω σ θ σ ω θ
≤ ≤
= ≡ + −    (6) 
be the well-being-maximising labour supply decision, and 
  ( ) ( )
0 1
, , ; ,1 , ;
e
v c MAX w e e cω σ θ σ ω θ
≤ ≤
= + −     (7) 
the associated indirect well-being function.   
 
The f.o.c. for maximisation is 
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 This is true of the formulation adopted by Boskin and Sheshinski (1978). 
6
 This formulation is consistent with that adopted by Boskin and Sheshinski (1978).   
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[ ]1 1
0, 0
1
c
u u
e
e ue c
ωθ
ω
θ σ ω σ ω
− 
− + ≤ ≥ − + + + 
l ,  (8) 
 
where the inequalities hold with complementary slackness.  From (8)  there is a 
reservation net wage rate 
  ( )
( )
( )
( )
,1
, ,
,1
,1 . .
1
c
u
c
uc
u
c
σ
ω σ θ
σθ
σ
θ σσ
=
+
− +
l
    (9) 
at or below which labour supply is zero and above which it is positive. This reservation 
wage rate is: 
• a strictly increasing function of unearned income, σ; 
• a strictly decreasing function of average consumption, c ; 
• a strictly decreasing function of the weight, θ,  given to happiness. 
 
When 0θ = , the reservation wage is just the conventional marginal rate of substitution 
between consumption and leisure at zero hours of work. The fact that it is decreasing in 
both   and  c θ  means that the Keeping up with the Joneses Effect is inducing people to 
work who would not otherwise have done so.  
 
Since, conditioning on   and  c θ ,  the labour supply decision is a conventional utility-
maximising decision, it follows that, when individual labour supply is positive, it is a 
strictly decreasing function of unearned income, while the effect of an increase in the 
(net) wage rate is ambiguous, though the compensated labour supply response is positive.   
From (8)  it follows that when labour-supply is positive it is a strictly increasing function 
of  c  - the Keeping up with the Joneses Effect – and, consistent with this, is also an 
increasing function of  θ .  In summary we have the following comparative static labour-
supply predictions in the case where labour supply is positive:  i.e.  ( ), ,cω ω σ θ>  
 
     0; 0; . 0; 0; 0
cf f f f f f f
e
cσ ω ω ω σ θ
∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
< = − > > >
∂ ∂ < ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂
7
.  (10) 
 
Turning to the indirect well-being function, this again will satisfy the standard conditions, 
including Roy’s identity, so: 
 
   ( )0; . , , , . 0
v v v v
e f cω σ θ
σ ω σ σ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
> = = >
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
,  (11) 
 
So, conditioning on average consumption, c , for individuals who work, well-being is a 
strictly increasing function of the net wage rate.  From (5)  and (7) the envelope theorem 
implies that 
                                                
7
 The superscript c denotes  the compensated labour supply function. 
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     0
v
c
∂
<
∂
 .     (12) 
Thus individuals are worse off the greater is the average consumption of others.  
 
3. Nash Equilibrium Labour Supply and Well-being 
 
So far we have examined labour supply and well-being for any arbitrary level of average 
consumption of the peer group - those with the same net wage rate.  To complete the 
analysis we need to determine this average level of consumption.  Since everyone 
maximises well-being taking as given the decisions of everyone else as reflected in the 
average consumption of the group, the relevant equilibrium concept is non-cooperative 
Nash.  Since everyone in the comparator group is identical, in the Nash equilibrium 
everyone ends up with the same level of labour supply and consumption. This common 
consumption is therefore the average consumption of each group, which implies that for 
everyone 1/ 2h =  
 
3.1 Labour Supply 
 
From (6) the Nash equilibrium level of labour supply can be characterised as the implicit 
solution to the equation: 
 
    ( ), , ,e f eω σ σ ω θ= + .    (13) 
To ensure that there is a unique well-defined Nash equilibrium assume that: 
 
    1
f
c
ω ω
∂
∀ <
∂
.     (14) 
 Denote the Nash equilibrium labour supply function by  ( ), ;nf ω σ θ .   
 
Note that it follows from (8) that the reservation wage  is now given by: 
 
   ( )
( )
( )
( )
,1
,
,1
,1 .
2(1 )
n
c
u
u
u
σ
ω σ θ
σθ
σ
θ σ
=
+
−
l
,   (15) 
 
which is a strictly increasing function of σ and a strictly decreasing function of θ with  
0  as  1
n
ω θ→ → .    The fact that the reservation wage falls with θ is  a manifestation of 
the Keeping up with the Joneses Effect since individuals are being induced to work who 
otherwise have chosen not to.  
 
From (13)  it follows that, when Nash labour supply is positive: 
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.
;
1 . 1 .
n n
f f f f
e
f fc c
f f
c c
ω σ
ω σ
ω ω
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
+ +
∂ ∂∂ ∂∂ ∂= =
∂ ∂∂ ∂
− −
∂ ∂
,   (16) 
 
so Nash labour supply responses to increases in the wage rate and unearned income differ 
from the individual labour supply response in two ways: 
(i) Increases in the wage rate and in unearned income raise the value of peer 
consumption which induces additional work effort; 
(ii) There is a multiplier effect at work whereby changes in labour supply induce 
changes in peer consumption which generates further changes in labour 
supply. 
 
The sign of both of these terms is indeterminate. However, from  (16) it follows that  
   . 0
1
c
nc n n
f
f f f
e
f
c
ω
ω ω σ
ω
∂
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= − = >
∂∂ ∂ ∂
−
∂
    (17) 
 
so the Slutsky-Hicks decomposition still applies to the Nash labour supply function, and  
the compensated Nash labour supply response is positive and is just the individual 
compensated response scaled up by the multiplier effect. 
 
Now, from (8), the Nash labour supply can be characterised through the condition: 
   1 . , 0
2(1 )
c c
u
uc
e
u u
θ
ω
θ
 
 + ≤ ≥
− 
 
l .      (18)  
 
So, when labour supply is positive, then, in the traditional case where happiness does not 
affect well-being ( )0θ =  the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and 
consumption equals the (net)  wage.  However when happiness does affect well-being, 
( )0θ > , the marginal rate of substitution is greater than the wage rate multiplied by a 
factor that (a) depends on the ratio of average to marginal utility of consumption, and (b) 
is increasing in the weight individuals place on happiness.   This additional term captures 
the distortion in Nash equilibrium labour supply induced by the Keeping up with the 
Joneses Effect.  It is this distortion that leads individuals to supply too much labour since 
it increases the attractiveness of work
8
.   
 
  
                                                
8
 Indeed it follows from (15) and (18) that in the extreme case where 1θ =  then 
( )( ,1) 0  and  , ,1 1n nfω σ ω σ= ≡ , so everybody spends their entire time in work.  
 
6 
 
3.2. Well-being 
 
By substituting the Nash equilibrium level of effort back into the well-being function 
given in (4) we obtain the Nash indirect well-being function: 
 
   ( ) ( )
11
, , , ,
2
n n
v v
θ
θ
ω σ θ ω σ θ
−   =     
%     (19) 
where 
   ( ) ( ) ( ), , , , ,1 , ,n n nv u f fω σ θ σ ω ω σ θ ω σ θ ≡ + − %   (20) 
 
is the Nash indirect well-offness function.   To understand what happens to well-being all 
we need to understand is what happens to well-offness. 
 
If  ( ),nω ω σ θ≤   labour supply is zero and   
  ( ) ( ) ( ), , ,1 0; ,1
n n n
n
c
v v v
v u uω σ θ σ σ
ω θ σ
∂ ∂ ∂
= ⇒ = = =
∂ ∂ ∂
% % %
%   (21) 
 so Roy’s identity holds: 
     .
n n
v v
e
ω σ
∂ ∂
=
∂ ∂
% %
.     (22) 
 
If  ( ),nω ω σ θ>   labour supply is positive, then, by differentiating (20) and using (18) 
we get:  
   .
2(1 )
n n
c
c
u
v f cu e
u
θ
ω
ω ω θ
 ∂ ∂ = −
∂ ∂ − 
 
%
;    (23) 
1 .
2(1 )
n n
c
c
u
v f cu
u
θ
ω
σ σ θ
 ∂ ∂ = −
∂ ∂ − 
 
%
;    (24) 
 
In the traditional case where individuals place no weight on happiness ( )0θ =  then (24) 
and (23) just reduce to their conventional forms.  In particular Roy’s identity (22) holds.  
However if 0θ >   a marginal change in the wage or benefit induces an additional effect 
on well-being that is positive (resp. negative) if the change causes labour supply to fall 
(resp. rise) and so reduce (resp. increase) the distortion on labour supply.   
 
In certain circumstances an increase in the wage rate could actually make people worse 
off as the distortion-intensifying effect dominates the direct benefit from a higher net 
wage.      
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Proposition 1  If 0θ >  well-being is a strictly decreasing function of the wage rate for 
those individuals for whom ( ), 0eω ω σ θ≈ ⇒ ≈ i.e. for some of those who are being 
induced to work only because of their desire to Keep up with the Joneses. 
Proof:  If  0e ≈   the first term on the RHS of (23) is approximately zero.  Moreover from 
the Slutsky-Hicks equation, (17),  0
n ncf f
ω ω
∂ ∂
≈ >
∂ ∂
so the only effect of the higher wage is 
to intensify the distortion and so make people worse off.   
 
Corollary 1.1   The individuals with the lowest level of well-offness and hence well-
being are no longer those with the lowest level of ability.   
 
4. Example 
 
If the well-offness function is Cobb-Douglas,  1( , ) , 0 1u c cα α α−= < <l l .  It is 
straightforward to check that  
 
( )
0, ( , )
(1 ) (1 )
, ; ( , , ) 2(1 )
, ( , )
2(1 ) 1
2(1 )
n
n n
n
f
ω ω σ θ
θ
α σ α ω α σ
ω σ θ ω σ θ θ
θ ω ω σ θ
α θθ ω
θ
 ≤

 − + − − = =  −   ≥+    − +    − 
and 
 
    
( )
1
(1 )
, ( , )
(1 )
( , , ) 2(1 )
.( ). , ,
1
2(1 )
n
n
n
v
α
α
α
α
σ ω ω σ θ
θ
α αω σ θ θ
ω σ ω ω ω σ θ
θ
θ
−
− −
 ≤

 
 + − =  −  + ≥
  +  − 
%  (25) 
 
From (29) it follows that  0
n
v
σ
∂
>
∂
%
 and that, for ( ),nω ω σ θ>  
 
 ( ) ( )
(1 )
0 , , ,0
n
n
n
v
v
v
α σω α ω ω σ θ ω ω σ
ω ω
σ
∂
− ∂ ∂ = − ⇒ < ∀ < < ∂ ∂ 
∂
%
%
%
   (26) 
 
Thus well-offness and hence well-being are strictly decreasing in the wage rate for 
precisely the group of individuals that are being induced to work purely because of the 
keeping up with the Joneses effect.   
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This is illustrated in Figure 1 in the Appendix. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
When we situate consumers in a social context and their consumption may depend on that 
of others, then many of the standard predictions of the conventional theory of consumer 
behaviour may be overturned.  Most strikingly those who are worst off in society are no 
longer those on the lowest wage.  The worst off will be people with a  sufficiently high 
wage that they are induced into work because of the Keeping up with the Joneses Effect.  
This has implications for the understanding of poverty and inequality and the design of 
tax/benefit systems that warrant further investigation. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
Figure 1: Well-Offness and Wages 
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